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Abstract
We provide a unifying, black-box tool for establishing existence of approximate equilibria in
weighted congestion games and, at the same time, bounding their Price of Stability. Our framework
can handle resources with general costs—including, in particular, decreasing ones—and is formu-
lated in terms of a set of parameters which are determined via elementary analytic properties of
the cost functions.
We demonstrate the power of our tool by applying it to recover the recent result of Caragiannis
and Fanelli [ICALP’19] for polynomial congestion games; improve upon the bounds for fair cost
sharing games by Chen and Roughgarden [Theory Comput. Syst., 2009]; and derive new bounds
for nondecreasing concave costs. An interesting feature of our framework is that it can be readily
applied tomixtures of different families of cost functions; for example, we provide bounds for games
whose resources are conical combinations of polynomial and concave costs.
In the core of our analysis lies the use of a unifying approximate potential function which is
simple and general enough to be applicable to arbitrary congestion games, but at the same time
powerful enough to produce state-of-the-art bounds across a range of different cost functions.
1 Introduction
Atomic congestion games are one of the most well-studied topics in algorithmic game theory [Rou16,
NRTV07]. In their most general form, players have weights and compete over a common set of re-
sources; the cost of each resource is a function of the total weight of the players that end up using
it. As a result, they can model a wide range of interesting applications including, e.g., network rout-
ing [Rou07] and load balancing [Vöc07], but also even cost-sharing games (via the use of decreasing
cost functions) like fair network design [TW07].
An important special case is that of unweighted congestion games, where the costs depend only
on the number of players that use each edge. In a seminal paper, Rosenthal [Ros73a] proved that
unweighted congestion games always have (pure Nash) equilibria. A key tool in his derivation was
the novel use of a potential function, which is able to capture the different players’ deviations in a very
elegant and concise way. Then, the desired equilibrium is derived as the minimizer of that function
(over all feasible outcomes of the game). This technique can also be viewed as an equilibrium refinement,
and has been a very influential idea in game theory [MS96]. It allows us not only to establish the
existence of equilibria, but in many cases, this special potential-minimizer equilibrium has additional
desired properties.
Of particular importance to us in this paper, is that it has been the de facto method for proving Price
of Stability (PoS) bounds in congestion games (see, e.g., [NRTV07, Ch. 18, 19]). The PoS notion [ADK+08,
CSSM04] captures the minimum approximation ratio of the social cost, among all equilibria, to the
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socially optimum outcome of the game (that might not be an equilibrium). In other words, the PoS is
the best-case counterpart of the notorious Price of Anarchy (PoA) notion introduced by Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou [KP99, Pap01]
Unfortunately, though, it is a well-known fact that general weighted congestion games do not al-
ways have equilibria [Ros73b] and thus, do not admit a potential function. To alleviate this, a line
of work has focused on designing approximate potential functions (see, e.g., [CR09, HKS14, CKS11,
CGGS19, CF19]): the minimizer of such functions is guaranteed to be an approximate equilibrium (as
opposed to an exact one that is given by Rosenthal’s potential in the unweighted case), while at the
same time it can achieve a good approximation ratio to the optimal social cost (providing, thus, an
upper bound for the approximate-equilibrium extension of the PoS notion). However, most of those
prior works use different approximate potentials, designed specially for the particular cost-function
model that each one studies.
Our goal in this paper is to provide a simple, high-level framework whose interface is agnostic to
the underlying potential function technicalities and which can readily be instantiated for all resource
costs at hand to derive meaningful bounds.
1.1 Related Work
Following the seminal work of [Ros73a, Ros73b], a long line of results has been devoted to the (non)ex-
istence of equilibria in weighted congestion games. [GMV05, LO01, FKS05] demonstrated that equi-
libria might not exist even in very simple classes of games, including network congestion games
with quadratic cost functions and games where player weights are either 1 or 2. On the other hand,
[FKS05, PS07, HK12] showed that equilibria do exist in games with affine or exponential cost func-
tions; [FKK+09, HKM12] proved the same for singleton games (where players can only occupy single
resources). Dunkel and Schulz [DS08] were able to extend the nonexistence instance of Fotakis et
al. [FKS05] to a hardness gadget, in order to show that, deciding whether a congestion game with step
cost functions has an equilibrium, is a (strongly) NP-complete problem.
Regarding the existence of approximate equilibria in general weighted congestion games, [CGG+20]
showed that gameswith 푛 players always have 푛-approximate equilibria, and this guarantee is tight (up
to logarithmic factors); they also proved that the corresponding decision problem, i.e., of the existence
of 훩̃(푛)-approximate equilibria, is NP-complete.
A lot of work has been focused on the important special case of polynomial congestions games,
parameterized by the maximum degree 푑 of the cost functions. Although, due to [FKS05] we already
know that exact equilibria do not in general exist in such games, Caragiannis et al. [CFGS11] were the
first to show that 훼-approximate equilibria do exist for 훼 = 푑!; this factor was later improved to 훼 =
푑 + 1 [HKS14, CGGS19] and 훼 = 푑 [CF19]. As a matter of fact, Caragiannis and Fanelli [CF19] provide
an even more comprehensive result that, for any choice of a parameter 훿 ∈ [0, 1], simultaneously
establishes the existence of (푑+훿)-approximate equilibria and gives an upper bound of 푑+1훿+1 on their PoS.
They achieve this by designing an appropriate approximate potential function, tailored to polynomial
costs. On the nonexistence front, [HKS14] first gave instances of very simple, two-player polynomial
congestion games that do not have 훼-approximate equilibria, for 훼 ≈ 1.153. This was recently improved
to 훼 = 훺̃(
√
푑) byChristodoulou et al. [CGG+20], who also establishedNP-hardness of the corresponding
existence decision problem.
The work of Hansknecht et al. [HKS14] is very relevant for our approach in this paper, since they
also propose a “generic” approximate potential function that can, in principle, be applied to general cost
functions. They instantiate it for polynomial costs to derive their aforementioned existence of (푑 + 1)-
approximate equilibria. Additionally, they also state a result about the existence of 32 -approximate
equilibria in games with nondecreasing concave costs; however, this proof in their paper is not com-
plete. Furthermore, [HKS14] focuses just on the existence of approximate equilibria, and thus it does
not provide any PoS bounds.
Another well-studied class of congestion games is that of fair cost sharing, where each resource
has a constant initial cost which is split equally among the players that use it. Thus, such games have
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Our Results
Cost functions Previous Work General Extreme Points
Polynomials of degree ≤ 푑 (휆, 푑+1휆 ), for 휆 ∈ [푑, 푑 + 1] (휆, 푑+1휆 ), for 휆 ∈ [푑, 푑 + 1] (푑, 1 + 1푑 ), (푑 + 1, 1)
[CF19] [Theorem 2]
Concave ( 32 , ∞) [HKS14] (휆, 휆휆−1 ), for 휆 ∈ [ 32 , 2] ( 32 , 3), (2, 2)
[Theorem 3]
Polynomials + Concave N/A (휆, 1 + 푑+1휆 ), for 휆 ∈ [푑, 푑 + 1] (푑, 2 + 1푑 ), (푑 + 1, 2)
[Theorem 5]
Fair cost sharing (휆, 1 + 2 log2(1+푊 )휆 ) , (훩(ln푤max) + 휆, 1 + ln푊휆 ), (훩(ln푤max), 1 + ln푊 ),
for 휆 = 훺(ln푤max) [CR09] for 휆 ≥ 1 [Theorem 4] (훩(ln푊 ), 훩(1))
Table 1: Our main results on the existence of (훼, 훽)-equilibria for different cost models. For polynomials of degree 푑 we
recover the result of [CF19]. For fair costs our results improve those of [CR09], although we get the same asymptotics.
decreasing cost functions. Finding the PoS for the special, undirected network version of such games
is a notorious open problem in the field (see, e.g., [ADK+08, FKL+06, BCFM13, BFM14, FHP16]). Very
relevant for us is the work of Chen and Roughgarden [CR09] who showed that general weighted fair
cost sharing games always have 훼-approximate equilibria whose PoS is at most 푂 ( log푊훼 ), for any
choice of parameter 훼 = 훺(log푤max), where 푤max is the maximum weight of any player and 푊 the
maximumpossible load in any resource. They achieve this by designing a special approximate potential
function, tailored to the specific form of the cost functions.
1.2 Our Results and Techniques
We propose a new approximate potential function (see (9)) for weighted congestion gameswith general
cost functions. In particular, our potential can be instantiated beyond the standardmodel of polynomial
cost functions and the common assumption of non-decreasingmonotonicity. However, this potential is
only used in the analysis part of our paper: we hide away its specific form by hard-coding it within the
proof of a unifying tool (Theorem 1) that can be used in a black-boxway to readily derive both existence
of approximate equilibria, and bounds on their PoS. This proof makes also use of a general, high-level
lemma that can capture the essence of the potential method as a technique for deriving existence and
PoS bounds for approximate equilibria (Lemma 1); we believe this might be of independent interest,
since in future work it could be used for alternative potential functions, beyond our choice of (9) in
this paper.
Our framework effectively works in two steps. Given a congestion game, first one has to determine
how good its cost functions are with respect to two simple, analytic properties (Definition 2). Then,
the resulting “goodness” parameters can be plugged straight into our master theorem (Theorem 1) to
deduce the existence of an (훼, 훽)-equilibrium; that is, an 훼-approximate (pure Nash) equilibriumwhose
social cost is at most a factor of 훽 away from the optimum.
We demonstrate the power of our tool by applying it to recover and improve prior bounds on the
existence of (훼, 훽)-equilibria for well-studied classes of congestion games, as well as to derive novel
results. The simplicity and the algebraic nature of our tool allows us to produce fine-grained bounds
in the form of a parametric trade-off curve that describes the relation between the 훼 and 훽 parameters
of the (훼, 훽)-equilibrium; in other words, all our results give a continuum of existence bounds. Our
bounds are summarized in Table 1.
More specifically, first (Theorem 2) we rederive the recent bounds of [CF19] for polynomial con-
gestion games, in a more “clean”, high-level way. Then (Theorem 4), we improve the 훼, 훽 parameters
on the (훼, 훽)-equilibrium existence results of [CR09] for fair cost-sharing games (a more detailed com-
parison can be seen in Fig. 1). Furthermore, we derive new results for (nondecreasing) concave costs:
we show that (휆, 휆휆−1 )-equilibria always exist, for all 휆 ∈ [ 32 , 2] (Theorem 3). The special corner case of a
( 32 , 3)-equilibrium is compatible, thus, with the 32-approximate equilibrium existence stated in [HKS14].
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Another interesting characteristic of our tool is its modularity: it can readily combine different
cost functions to give bounds for more complex congestion games (see Definition 3). For example,
we prove that games with cost functions that are conical combinations of 푑-degree polynomials and
concave costs, always have (휆, 1 + 푑+1휆 )-equilibria, where 휆 ranges in [푑, 푑 + 1] (Theorem 5).
Finally, an added advantage of our black-box method is that it also results in arguably simpler and
more streamlined proofs for the existence and PoS bounds.
Before concluding the overview of our results, wewant to elaborate a bitmore on the comparison to
the potential approach ofHansknecht et al. [HKS14]. Although [HKS14] does not dealwith PoS bounds,
as far as existence of approximate equilibria is concerned, their paper is rather similar in principle to
ours. They propose a general potential function which is based on a discrete interpretation of the
cost function’s integral, which corresponds to the first component of our potential in (9). We take a
different approach by using directly the actual integral, and also adding an extra term that corresponds
to a weighted average of the costs of the players’ weights. In that way, we avoid a lot of the intricate
technicalities that are involved with the discrete arguments (e.g., orderings of the weights) in [HKS14],
making the application of our potential (via our high-level tool of Theorem 1) more “tractable” for a
wider range of cost functions.
2 Model and Notation
We use ℝ+ to denote the set of nonnegative real numbers.
In a (weighted) congestion game  there are finite, nonempty sets of players 푁 and resources 퐸. Let
푛 = |푁 |. Each player 푖 ∈ 푁 has a weight 푤푖 ∈ ℝ+ and a strategy set 푆푖 ⊆ 2퐸 . We use 푤min = min푖∈푁 푤푖
and 푤max = max푖∈푁 푤푖 for the minimum and maximum player weights, respectively, and for a subset
of players 퐼 ⊆ 푁 , we use 푤퐼 = ∑푖∈퐼 푤푖 to denote the sum of their weights. For the special case of
푤min = 푤max = 1, that is, if all weights are 1, we say that  is unweighted.
Associated with each resource 푒 ∈ 퐸 is a cost function 푐푒 ∶ ℝ+ ⟶ ℝ+. In general, we will make no
extra assumptions on the cost functions. However, important special cases, that we will also study as
applications of the main tool of our paper, include polynomial congestion games of degree 푑 , for 푑 ≥ 1
integer, and fair cost sharing games. In the former, the cost functions are polynomials with nonnegative
coefficients and degree at most 푑 ; in the later, cost functions are (decreasing) of the form 푐푒(푥) = 푎푒푥
where 푎푒 is a positive real.
A (pure) strategy profile (or outcome) is a choice of strategies s = (푠1, 푠2, ..., 푠푛) ∈ S = 푆1 ×⋯× 푆푛 . We
use the standard game-theoretic notation s−푖 = (푠1,… , 푠푖−1, 푠푖+1,… 푠푛), S−푖 = 푆1 ×⋯ × 푆푖−1 × 푆푖+1 ×⋯ × 푆푛 .
In that way, for example, we can denote s = (푠푖 , s−푖). Given a profile s ∈ S, we define the load푥푒(s) of resource 푒 as the total weight of players that use resource 푒 at outcome s, i.e., 푥푒(s) = 푤푁푒(s) =∑푖∈푁∶푒∈푠푖 푤푖 , where푁푒(s) is the set of players using 푒. We will use푊 = ∑푖∈푁 푤푖 to denote themaximum
possible load of any resource. The cost of player 푖 is defined by 퐶푖(s) = ∑푒∈푠푖 푐푒(푥푒(s)). The social cost
of a strategy profile s is the weighted sum of the players’ costs퐶(s) = ∑푖∈푁 푤푖 ⋅ 퐶푖(s) = ∑푒∈퐸 푥푒(s) ⋅ 푐푒(푥푒(s)).
We use OPT() = mins∈푆 퐶(s) to denote the optimum social cost over all outcomes.
An outcome s is an 훼-approximate (pure Nash) equilibrium, for 훼 ≥ 1, if퐶푖(s) ≤ 훼 ⋅ 퐶푖(푠′푖 , s−푖) for all 푖 ∈ 푁 , 푠′푖 ∈ 푆푖 (1)
That is, no player can unilaterally deviate from s and improve her cost by more than a factor of 훼 . No-
tice that for the special case of 훼 = 1we get the definition of the standard, exact pure Nash equilibrium.
We denote the set of all 훼-equilibria of  by NE훼 () Then, the 훼-approximate Price of Stability (훼-PoS)
of  is the social cost of the best-case Nash equilibrium over the optimum social cost:
PoS훼 () = min
s∈NE훼 () 퐶(s)OPT() . (2)
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For 훼 = 1 we get the standard definition of the Price of Stability (PoS) for exact equilibria [ADK+08].
We combine the notions of an approximate equilibrium with approximating the optimum social cost
in the following definition:
Definition 1 ((훼, 훽)-equilibrium). Fix a congestion game . A strategy profile s is an (훼, 훽)-equilibrium
if it is an 훼-approximate equilibrium of  (see (1)) and its social cost is at most 훽 times the optimal cost
of , i.e., 퐶(s) ≤ 훽 ⋅ OPT().
Notice that if a game has an (훼, 훽)-equilibrium then, due to (2), its 훼-PoS is at most 훽 .
2.1 Equivalent Cost Functions
It is not difficult to see that, in any weighted congestion game, the cost functions of each resource are
actually evaluated on finitely many points: although our model assumes 푐푒 to be defined over the entireℝ+, its values outside the domain {푥푒(s) | s ∈ S } are irrelevant. In particular, this domain is included
within the set of different sums of weights
 = { ∑푖∈푁 푦푖 ⋅ 푤푖 |||| 푦푖 ∈ {0, 1}, 푖 ∈ 푁} .
This means that one only needs to define costs on at most | | = 2푛 different values: any two games
whose costs coincide on are equivalent.
However, it is still convenient to treat our costs as functions over ℝ+. First, because this allows
for simple and succinct representations. But of particular importance to us, is also the fact that our
main tool (Theorem 1) can be applied to all integrable cost functions (so that Definition 2 can be uti-
lized). From the above discussion, it should be obvious that any congestion game has (infinitely) many
equivalent representations, that is, different extensions from to ℝ+. Such an extension can always
be done in a way that 푐푒 is an integrable function (since is finite).
It is interesting to point out here that different representations can potentially give different exis-
tence and PoS bounds via our tool. Although we do not deal with this feature for most of the paper, it is
important for our fair cost sharing results (Section 4.3); since function 푥 ↦ 1/푥 is not integrable over
the interval [0, 푤min) (and as a matter of fact, not even defined on 푥 = 0) we have the freedom, accord-
ing to the discussion above, to redefine it in any way we want on [0, 푤min), so that it is a well-defined,
integrable function over ℝ+.
3 The Main Tool
In this section we present our framework for establishing existence of (훼, 훽)-equilibria in weighted
congestion games with general cost functions. We begin with the following lemma, that tries to distil
and abstract the potential method technique in congestion games. Specialized or restricted forms of it
have essentially been used, even if not explicitly stated, in multiple works in the past (see, e.g., [CR09,
HKS14, CF19]). It can be seen as a more fine-grained version of [CGGS19, Lemma 4.1], although some
extra care is needed to adapt it to the more abstract setting of our paper and utilize its full power.
Lemma 1 (PotentialMethod). Fix a congestion game. Assume that, for each resource 푒, there exist positive
reals 훼1,푒 , 훼2,푒 , 훽1,푒 , 훽2,푒 , and a function 휙푒 ∶ 2푁 ⟶ ℝ such that 휙푒(∅) = 0 and훼1,푒 ≤ 휙푒(퐼 ∪ {푖}) − 휙푒(퐼 )푤푖 ⋅ 푐푒(푤퐼 + 푤푖) ≤ 훼2,푒 for all 푖 ∈ 푁 , 퐼 ⊆ 푁 ⧵ {푖}; (3)훽1,푒 ≤ 휙푒(퐼 )푤퐼 ⋅ 푐푒(푤퐼 ) ≤ 훽2,푒 for all ∅ ≠ 퐼 ⊆ 푁 . (4)
Then the game has an (훼, 훽)-equilibrium with훼 = max푒∈퐸 훼2,푒훼1,푒 and 훽 = max푒∈퐸 훽2,푒/훼1,푒min푒∈퐸 훽1,푒/훼1,푒 .
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Proof. Define function 훷(s) = ∑푒∈퐸 1훼1,푒 휙푒(푁푒(s)) over all feasible outcomes. We will show that 훷 can
serve as a desired approximate potential function for our game; that is, for any profiles s, s′ and any
player 푖, it satisfies: 훷(s) ≤ 훷(푠′푖 , s−푖) ⟹ 퐶푖(s) ≤ 훼 ⋅ 퐶푖(푠′푖 , s−푖) (5)훷(s) ≤ 훷(s′) ⟹ 퐶(s) ≤ 훽 ⋅ 퐶(s′). (6)
This would be enough to establish our lemma: any (global) minimizer of 훷 is an 훼-approximate equi-
librium, due to (5), and at the same time, due to (6), its social cost is within a factor of 훽 from the social
cost of any other profile (and, thus, from the optimal one). Notice also, that such a minimizer always
exists, since the set S of feasible outcomes is finite.
For (5) first, denote for simplicity 푁푒 = 푁푒(s), 푥푒 = 푥푒(s) and 푁 ′푒 = 푁푒(푠′푖 , s−푖), 푥′푒 = 푥푒(푠′푖 , s−푖) for all
facilities 푒. Then, we have훷(푠′푖 , s−푖) − 훷(s) = ∑푒∈퐸 1훼1,푒 [휙푒(푁 ′푒 ) − 휙푒(푁푒)]= ∑푒∈푠′푖 ⧵푠푖 1훼1,푒 [휙푒(푁푒 ∪ {푖}) − 휙푒(푁푒)] + ∑푒∈푠푖⧵푠′푖 1훼1,푒 [휙푒(푁푒 ⧵ {푖}) − 휙푒(푁푒)]
≤ ∑푒∈푠′푖 ⧵푠푖 훼2,푒훼1,푒푤푖푐푒(푥푒 + 푤푖) − ∑푒∈푠푖⧵푠′푖 푤푖푐푒(푥푒)
≤ 푤푖 [훼 ∑푒∈푠′푖 ⧵푠푖 푐푒(푥푒 + 푤푖) − ∑푒∈푠푖⧵푠′푖 푐푒(푥푒)]
≤ 푤푖 [훼 ( ∑푒∈푠′푖 ⧵푠푖 푐푒(푥푒 + 푤푖) + ∑푒∈푠′푖 ∩푠푖 푐푒(푥푒)) − ( ∑푒∈푠푖⧵푠′푖 푐푒(푥푒) + ∑푒∈푠′푖 ∩푠푖 푐푒(푥푒))]= 푤푖 [훼퐶푖(푠′푖 , s−푖) − 퐶푖(s)] .
The first inequality holds due to (3); the second due to the definition of 훼 ; and the third one because훼 ≥ 1. The fact that the cost functions are nonnegative is a critical component in all of them as well. The
chain of inequalities above demonstrate that, if 훷(푠′푖 , s−푖) −훷(s) is nonnegative then 훼퐶푖(푠′푖 , s−푖) −퐶푖(s)
is nonnegative, thus proving (5).
For (6) next, denote 푁푒 = 푁푒(s), 푥푒 = 푥푒(s) and 푁 ′푒 = 푁푒(s′), 푥′푒 = 푥푒(s′). Then, we have:훷(s′) − 훷(s) = ∑푒∈퐸 1훼1,푒 휙푒(푁 ′푒 ) − ∑푒∈퐸 1훼1,푒 휙푒(푁푒)
≤ ∑푒∈퐸 훽2,푒훼1,푒 푥′푒푐푒(푥′푒 ) − ∑푒∈퐸 훽1,푒훼1,푒 푥푒푐푒(푥푒)
≤ max푒∈퐸 훽2,푒훼1,푒 ⋅ ∑푒∈퐸 푥′푒푐푒(푥′푒 ) − min푒∈퐸 훽1,푒훼1,푒 ⋅ ∑푒∈퐸 푥푒푐푒(푥푒)= max푒∈퐸 훽2,푒훼1,푒 ⋅ 퐶(s′) − min푒∈퐸 훽1,푒훼1,푒 ⋅ 퐶(s)= min푒∈퐸 (훽1,푒/훼1,푒) ⋅ [훽퐶(s′) − 퐶(s)] ,
where for the first inequality we deployed (4). The chain of inequalities above demonstrate that if훷(s′) − 훷(s) is nonnegative then 훽퐶(s′) − 퐶(s) is nonnegative as well, this establishing (6).
We continue with defining a critical notion that will act as the medium to utilize our main black-
box tool in Theorem 1. It involves a set of parameters, that determine how “well” a given cost function
behaves with respect to two specific, simple analytic properties (namely (7) and (8)). These properties
can be interpreted as bounds on the average of the cost function over continuous intervals.
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Definition 2 (Good Cost Functions). Fix a congestion game . A function 푐 ∶ ℝ+ ⟶ ℝ+ will be
called (훼1, 훼2, 훽1, 훽2)-good (with respect to ), for 훼1, 훼2, 훽1, 훽2 > 0, if there exists a nonnegative constant휉 such that, for all 푥 ∈ {0} ∪ [푤min,푊 ], 푤 ∈ [푤min, 푤max]:훼1 ⋅ 푐(푥 + 푤) − 휉 ⋅ 푐(푤) ≤ 1푤 ∫ 푥+푤푥 푐(푡) 푑푡 ≤ 훼2 ⋅ 푐(푥 + 푤) − 휉 ⋅ 푐(푤) (7)
and for all 푥 ∈ [푤min,푊 ]:훽1 ⋅ 푐(푥) − 휉 ⋅ 푐min(푥) ≤ 1푥 ∫ 푥0 푐(푡) 푑푡 ≤ 훽2 ⋅ 푐(푥) − 휉 ⋅ 푐max(푥), (8)
where 푐min(푥) = min푦∈[푤min ,푥] 푐(푦), 푐max(푥) = max푦∈[푤min ,푥] 푐(푦).
Definition 3 (Good Games). A congestion game will be called {(훼1,푗 , 훼2,푗 , 훽1,푗 , 훽2,푗)}푗∈퐽 -good if any cost
function is a conical combination of such good functions. Formally, for any 푒 ∈ 퐸 there exists a
nonempty 퐽푒 ⊆ 퐽 and nonnegative constants {휆푒,푗}푗∈퐽푒 , such that푐푒(푡) = ∑푗∈퐽푒 휆푒,푗푐푗(푡)
where, for all 푗 ∈ 퐽 , 푐푗 is a (훼1,푗 , 훼2,푗 , 훽1,푗 , 훽2,푗)-good function (see Definition 2).
Remark 1. Notice that an important special case of Definition 3 is when 퐽 = 퐸, 퐽푒 = {푒}, and 휆푒,푒 = 1,
meaning that the actual cost functions of the game are good themselves. As a matter of fact, it is not
hard to see that any good game  can be transformed to a strategically equivalent one ′ that has
that property. First, replace each resource 푒 of  with a gadget of “parallel” resources {(푒, 푗)|푗 ∈ 퐽푒},
each having a cost function of 푐(푒,푗)(푡) = 휆푒,푗푐푗 (푡); this results in a strategically equivalent game ′ with
resources 퐸′ = {(푒, 푗)|푒 ∈ 퐸, 푗 ∈ 퐽푒}. Next, just observe that Definition 2 is invariant under nonnegative
scalar multiplication: since functions 푐푗 satisfy conditions (7) and (8), so do functions 휆푒,푗 ⋅ 푐푗 that are
exactly the cost functions of the new game ′.
Remark 2 (Increasing Good Functions). If a cost function is nondecreasing, then (8) can be replaced by
the (weaker, sufficient) condition:훽1푐(푥) ≤ 1푥 ∫ 푥0 푐(푡) 푑푡 ≤ (훽2 − 휉 )푐(푥), (8′)
since 0 ≤ 푐(푦) ≤ 푐(푥) for any 푦 ∈ [푤min, 푥].
Now we are ready to state our main tool. This is essentially the interface of our entire framework:
under the hood it uses a specific potential function form (see (9)), but its statement involves only
the goodness parameters of the cost functions, as defined above. In that way, one can readily derive
meaningful bounds about the existence of (훼, 훽)-equilibria in a black-box way, just by studying the
simple analytic properties given in (2) and the plugging the parameters in the theorem below:
Theorem 1. Any
{(훼1,푗 , 훼2,푗 , 훽1,푗 , 훽2,푗 )}푗∈퐽 -good congestion game has an (훼, 훽)-equilibrium with훼 = max푗∈퐽 훼2,푗훼1,푗 and 훽 = max푗∈퐽 훽2,푗/훼1,푗min푗∈퐽 훽1,푗/훼1,푗 .
Proof. First notice that, by Remark 1, it is without loss to assume that 퐽 = 퐸 and that any cost function푐푒 , 푒 ∈ 퐸, is (훼1,푒 , 훼2,푒 , 훽1,푒 , 훽2,푒)-good. Denote by 휉푒 (a choice of) the parameter 휉 for which resource 푒
satisfies Definition 2.
We will then show that functions휙푒(퐼 ) = ∫ 푤퐼0 푐푒(푡) 푑푡 + 휉푒 ∑푖∈퐼 푤푖푐푒(푤푖) (9)
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satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1,
Fix some resource 푒 ∈ 퐸, a player 푖 and a subset 퐼 ⊆ 푁 ⧵ {푖} of remaining players. For simplicity,
from now on we drop the 푒 subscripts and also denote 푤 = 푤푖 and 푥 = 푤퐼 . Then,
휙(퐼 ∪ {푖}) − 휙(퐼 ) = ∫ 푥+푤0 푐푒(푡) 푑푡 − ∫ 푥0 푐푒(푡) 푑푡 + 휉푒 (∑푗∈퐼 푤푗푐푒(푤푗 ) − ∑푗∈퐼∪{푖}푤푗푐푒(푤푗))= ∫ 푥+푤푥 푐(푡) 푑푡 + 휉푤푐(푤).
So, by deploying (7), it is not difficult to see that훼1푐(푥 + 푤) ≤ 1푤 [휙(퐼 ∪ {푖}) − 휙(퐼 )] ≤ 훼2푐(푥 + 푤),
and thus condition (3) of Lemma 1 is indeed satisfied.
Next, observe that since 푤푗 ∈ [푤min, 푤max] for all 푗 ∈ 퐼 , and 푥 = ∑푗∈퐼 푤푗 , we have the bounds푐min(푥) ≤ min푗∈퐼 푐(푤푗) ≤ 1푥 ∑푗∈퐼 푤푗푐(푤푗) ≤ max푗∈퐼 푐(푤푗 ) ≤ 푐max(푥), (10)
where the first and the last inequalities hold due to the fact that
{푤푗 | 푗 ∈ 퐼 } ⊆ [푤min, 푥]. Assuming퐼 ≠ ∅, we have that 푥 ∈ [푤min,푊 ] and so we can use (10) and (8) to bound 1푥 휙(퐼 ) from below and above
by: 훽1푐(푥) ≤ 1푥 휙(퐼 ) = 1푥 ∫ 푥0 푐(푡) 푑푡 + 휉 1푥 ∑푗∈퐼 푤푗푐(푤푗) ≤ 훽2푐(푥).
Thus, condition (4) of Lemma 1 is also satisfied.
4 Applications
In this section we present several applications of our black-box Theorem 1, that demonstrate both its
power and simplicity. In accordance to the nature of that tool, they all share a common structure: first,
we prove lemmas describing the right goodness parameters (according to Definition 2) for each special
cost function of interest (see Lemmas 2 to 5); then, we plug them in Theorem 1 to derive our bounds
(see Theorems 2 to 4).
4.1 Polynomial Costs
We start with polynomial cost functions, arguably the most studied setting in congestion games. We
recover the result from Caragiannis and Fanelli [CF19] that, for polynomials of degree at most 푑 with
nonnegative coefficients, there exist (푑 + 훿)-approximate equilibria with social cost at most 푑+1푑+훿 times
the optimum, for any 훿 ∈ [0, 1]. This is the currently best known guarantee of (훼, 훽)-equilibria for
polynomial cost functions. Let us begin by analysing the goodness parameters of each monomial.
Lemma 2. Any monomial of degree 푑 ≥ 1 is (휇, 1, 1푑+1 , 휇)-good, for any 휇 ∈ [ 1푑+1 , 1푑 ].
Proof. Fix a degree 푑 ≥ 1. We will show that the function 푐(푥) = 푥푑 satisfies conditions (7) and (8) with훼1 = 휉 + 1푑 + 1 , 훼2 = 1, 훽1 = 1푑 + 1 , 훽2 = 휉 + 1푑 + 1 ,
for all 휉 ∈ [0, 1푑(푑+1) ]. Then, performing the change of variables 휇 = 휉 + 1푑+1 establishes our lemma, since휇 ∈ [0 + 1푑+1 , 1푑(푑+1) + 1푑+1 ] = [ 1푑+1 , 1푑 ].
8
To prove the bounds in 훼1, 훼2, we are interested in the quantity푎(푤, 푥) = 1푤 ∫ 푥+푤푥 푐(푡)푑푡 + 휉 푐(푤) = 1(푑 + 1)푤 ((푥 + 푤)푑+1 − 푥푑+1) + 휉푤푑 .
By applying the binomial expansion rules, and collecting similar terms, we can further write
푎(푤, 푥) = 1(푑 + 1)푤 (푤푑+1 + 푑∑푗=1(푑 + 1푗 )푥 푗푤푑+1−푗 + 푥푑+1 − 푥푑+1) + 휉푤푑+1= 1푑 + 1 (푤푑 + 푑∑푗=1(푑 + 1푗 )푥 푗푤푑−푗) + 휉푤푑= ( 1푑 + 1 + 휉)푤푑 + 푑∑푗=1 1푑 + 1(푑 + 1푗 )푥 푗푤푑−푗= (휉 + 1푑 + 1)푤푑 + 푑∑푗=1 1푑 − 푗 + 1(푑푗 )푥 푗푤푑−푗 , (11)
where in the last step we simply use the fact that, for 1 ≤ 푗 ≤ 푑 , 1푑+1(푑+1푗 ) = 1푑−푗+1(푑푗 ). We would like to
get upper and lower bounds on 푎(푤, 푥) involving 푐(푥 + 푤), which can be written as푐(푥 + 푤) = (푥 + 푤)푑 = 푤푑 + 푑∑푗=1(푑푗 )푥 푗푤푑−푗 . (12)
By comparing the coefficients of (11) and (12), we get that (7) is satisfied with훼1 = min{휉 + 1푑 + 1 , min푗=1,…,푑 { 1푑 − 푗 + 1}} = min{휉 + 1푑 + 1 , 1푑 } = 휉 + 1푑 + 1훼2 = max{휉 + 1푑 + 1 , max푗=1,…,푑 { 1푑 − 푗 + 1}} = max{휉 + 1푑 + 1 , 1} = 1,
where to compute the maxima and minima we used the fact that 휉 + 1푑+1 ≤ 1푑(푑+1) + 1푑+1 = 1푑 ≤ 1, due to
the assumptions that 휉 ≤ 1푑(푑+1) and 푑 ≥ 1.
For the bounds in 훽1, 훽2, since 푥푑 is nondecreasing we can use the simpler condition (8′). Then, we
only have to observe that 1푥 ∫ 푥0 푐(푡)푑푡 = 1푑 + 1푥푑 = 1푑 + 1푐(푥)
and 1푥 ∫ 푥0 푐(푡)푑푡 + 휉 푐(푥) = 1푑 + 1푥푑 + 휉푥푑 = (휉 + 1푑 + 1)푐(푥).
For the special case of constant cost functions, i.e., 0-degree monomials, it is not difficult to get the
following:
Lemma 3. Any constant function is (1, 1, 1, 1)-good.
Proof. Follows directly from Definition 2 by taking 휉 = 0: for any constant function 푐(푥) = 푐 we have푐(푥 + 푤) = 푐(푥) = 1푤 ∫ 푥+푤푥 푐(푡)푑푡 = 1푥 ∫ 푥0 푐(푡)푑푡 = 푐.
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Theorem 2. Any weighted polynomial congestion game of degree 푑 ≥ 1 has an (휆, 푑+1휆 )-equilibrium, for
any 휆 ∈ [푑, 푑 + 1].
Proof. Fix a maximum degree 푑 ≥ 1 and a parameter 휆 ∈ [푑, 푑 + 1]. Utilizing Lemma 2 with 휇 = 1푘+1
and Lemma 3, we can see that monomials of degree 푘 = 0,… , 푑 − 1 are ( 1푘+1 , 1, 1푘+1 , 1푘+1 )-good; and
utilizing Lemma 2 with 휇 = 1휆 we get that the monomial of degree 푑 is ( 1휆 , 1, 1푑+1 , 1휆 )-good.
Since any polynomial of degree (at most) 푑 is a conical combination of monomials of degree 푘 =0, 1,… , 푑 , in light of Definition 3, we can deduce that our game is {(훼1,푘 , 훼2,푘 , 훽1,푘 , 훽2,푘)}푘=0,…,푑-good,
with 훼1,푘 = { 1휆 , 푘 = 푑,1푘+1 , 푘 < 푑; 훼2,푘 = 1; 훽1,푘 =
{ 1푑+1 , 푘 = 푑,1푘+1 , 푘 < 푑; 훽2,푘 =
{ 1휆 , 푘 = 푑,1푘+1 , 푘 < 푑.
Thus, by Theorem 1 we conclude that our game has an (훼 , 훽)-equilibrium with훼 = max0≤푘≤푑 훼2,푘훼1,푘 = max {1, 2,… , 푑, 휆} = 휆,
and
훽 = max0≤푘≤푑 훽2,푘훼1,푘min0≤푘≤푑 훽1,푘훼1,푘 = 1min{1,… , 1, 1/(푑+1)1/휆 } = max
{1, 푑 + 1휆 } = 푑 + 1휆 .
The parameter 휆 quantifies the trade-off curve between the approximation guarantee on the exis-
tence of 훼-approximate equilibria and their PoS. At one extreme case 휆 = 푑+1, we get that 훼 = 푑+1 and훽 = 1; in other words, there always exist (푑 + 1)-approximate equilibria with an optimal PoS of 1 (as a
matter of fact, from [CGGS19]we already know that every social optimum is itself a (푑+1)-approximate
equilibrium). At the other extreme case 휆 = 푑 , we get that훼 = 푑, 훽 = 푑 + 1푑 = 1 + 1푑 ;
in other words, there always exist 푑-approximate equilibria with PoS at most 1 + 1푑 .
4.2 Concave Costs
We now look at nondecreasing concave cost functions. The best known result in this setting is due
to [HKS14], that stated that 3/2-approximate equilibria exist. Unfortunately, the proof in their paper
is not complete; and moreover, no provable guarantee on the price of stability was provided. In this
section, not only we provide a simpler proof of this result, but we also extend it for a range of 휆-
approximate equilibria with 휆 ∈ [3/2, 2], and for a guarantee on the Price of Stability.
Lemma 4. Any nondecreasing concave function is (휇, 휇 + 12 , 12 , 휇 + 12 )-good, for all 휇 ∈ [ 12 , 1].
Proof. Fix a nondecreasing concave function 푐 ∶ ℝ+ ⟶ ℝ+ and a parameter 0 ≤ 휉 ≤ 12 . First note that,
since 푐 is nonnegative and concave, it must be subadditive. That is, for all 푥, 푧 ≥ 0:푐(푥) + 푐(푧) ≥ 푐(푥 + 푧) (13)
Furthermore, from the Hermite-Hadamard inequality (see, e.g., [ML85]) and the fact that 푐 is nonde-
creasing, for any 0 ≤ 푎 < 푏:
푓 (푎) + 푓 (푏)2 ≤ 1푏 − 푎 ∫ 푏푎 푓 (푡) 푑푡 ≤ 푓 (푏). (14)
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Applying first (14) for 푎 = 푥 and 푏 = 푥 + 푤 we get that푐(푥) + 푐(푥 + 푤)2 ≤ 1푤 ∫ 푥+푤푥 푐(푡) 푑푡 ≤ 푐(푥 + 푤),
so 1푤 ∫ 푥+푤푥 푐(푡) 푑푡 + 휉 ⋅ 푐(푤) ≤ 푐(푥 + 푤) + 휉 푐(푤) ≤ (1 + 휉 )푐(푥 + 푧)
and 1푤 ∫ 푥+푤푥 푐(푡) 푑푡 + 휉 ⋅ 푐(푤) ≥ 푐(푥) + 푐(푥 + 푤)2 + 휉 푐(푤)
≥
12푐(푥 + 푤) + 휉 [푐(푥) + 푐(푤)], since 휉 ≤ 12 ,
≥ (12 + 휉) 푐(푥 + 푤), due to (13).
Thus, condition (7) is satisfied with 훼1 = 12 + 휉 , 훼2 = 1 + 휉 .
Next, applying (14) for 푎 = 0 and 푏 = 푥 we get that12푐(푥) ≤ 푐(0) + 푐(푥)2 ≤ 1푥 ∫ 푥0 푐(푡) 푑푡 ≤ 푐(푥) = (1 + 휉 )푐(푥) − 휉 푐(푥),
thus condition (8′) is satisfied with 훽1 = 12 , 훽2 = 1 + 휉 .
Summarizing, we have shown (seeDefinition 2) that any concave cost function is (휉+ 12 , 휉+1, 12 , 휉+1)-
good, for any 휉 ∈ [0, 12 ]. Performing the change of variables 휇 = 휉 + 12 concludes our proof.
Theorem 3. Any weighted congestion game with nondecreasing concave cost functions has a (휆, 휆휆−1 )-
equilibrium, for any 휆 ∈ [ 32 , 2].
Proof. Fix a parameter 휆 ∈ [ 32 , 2] and let 휇 = 12(휆−1) . Then, 휇 ∈ [ 12 , 1] and thus, due to Lemma 4, we can
deduce that our game is (휇, 휇 + 12 , 12 , 휇 + 12 )-good (according to Definition 2). Deploying Theorem 1 we
can establish the existence of an a (훼, 훽)-equilibrium with
훼 = 휇 + 12휇 = 1 + 12휇 = 1 + (휆 − 1) = 휆 and 훽 = (휇 + 12 )/휇12 /휇 = 2휇 + 1 = 1휆 − 1 + 1 = 휆휆 − 1 .
4.3 Fair Cost Sharing
In this section, we focus on the fair cost sharing model in which 푐푒(푥) = 푎푒푥 , where 푎푒 is a positive,
resource-dependent value. We assume that 푤min = 1; this is without loss, since we can just rescale the
player weights. This setting was studied by Chen and Roughgarden [CR09]. Here we improve on their
results (see Fig. 1), with a simpler proof.
We must notice that the function 푥 ↦ 푎푒/푥 is not integrable in an interval starting at 0, and hence
we cannot immediately apply our Definition 2. However, based on our discussion in Section 2.1 we
can modify the game in order to overcome this. First, we assume for our analysis that 푎푒 = 1 since any
other choice of 푎푒 can be seen as a trivial conical combination of the function 1/푥 (see Definition 3).
Next, we change the cost function 푐푒(푥) to be constant and equal to 휆 in the interval [0, 1), for some휆 ≥ 1.
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Lemma 5. Fix a weighted congestion game with 푤min = 1. For any 휆 ≥ 1, the cost function
푐(푥) = {1/푥, 푥 ≥ 1,휆, 0 ≤ 푥 < 1
is (훼1, 훼2, 훽1, 훽2)-good with훼1 = 1, 훼2 = max((1 + 1푤max) ln(1 + 푤max), ln(푤max) + 휆) ,훽1 = 휆, 훽2 = ln푊 + 휆.
Proof. We will choose 휉 = 0 in the Definition 2 of good cost functions. Thus, we need to find nonneg-
ative quantities 훼1, 훼2, 훽1, 훽2 such that, for 푥 ∈ {0} ∪ [1,푊 ], 푤 ∈ [1, 푤max],훼1 ⋅ 푐(푥 + 푤) ≤ 1푤 ∫ 푥+푤푥 푐(푡)푑푡 ≤ 훼2 ⋅ 푐(푥 + 푤),
and for all 푥 ∈ [1,푊 ], 훽1 ⋅ 푐(푥) ≤ 1푥 ∫ 푥0 푐(푡)푑푡 ≤ 훽2 ⋅ 푐(푥).
For the bounds in 훼1, 훼2, we are interested in upper and lower bounds on the ratio푅(푤, 푥) = 1푤 ∫ 푥+푤푥 푐(푡)푑푡푐(푥 + 푤) .
When 푥 ≥ 1, this becomes푅(푤, 푥) = 1푤 (ln(푥 + 푤) − ln(푥))1푥+푤 = (1 + 푥푤) ln (1 + 푤푥 ) ;
on the other hand, when 푥 = 0, this becomes푅(푤, 0) = 1푤 (ln(푤) + 휆)1푤 = ln(푤) + 휆.
Thus, we get 푅(푤, 푥) = { (1 + 푥푤 ) ln (1 + 푤푥 ) , 푥 ≥ 1;
ln푤 + 휆, 푥 = 0.
In Lemma 6 in the Appendix, we show that the upper branch of 푅(푤, 푥) is increasing in 푤 and de-
creasing in 푥 ; hence, it is maximized at 푤 → 푤max, 푥 → 1, for a value of 푅(푤max, 1) = (1 + 1푤max) ln(1+푤max); and minimized at 푤 → 1, 푥 → 푊 , for a value of 푅(1,푊 ) ≥ 푅(1,∞) = 1. On the other hand, the
lower branch is maximized at 푤 → 푤max, for a value of 푅(푤max, 0) = ln(푤max) + 휆; and minimized at푤 → 1, for a value of 푅(1, 0) = 휆 ≥ 1. This gives the desired bounds on 훼1 and 훼2.
Next, we look at the bounds in 훽1, 훽2. Since 푥 ∈ [1,푊 ] we have that ∫ 푥0 푐(푡)푑푡 = ln 푥 + 휆. Moreover,
it is immediate to observe that휆 ⋅ 푐(푥) = 휆 ⋅ 1푥 ≤ 1푥 (ln 푥 + 휆) ≤ 1푥 (ln푊 + 휆) = (ln푊 + 휆) ⋅ 푐(푥).
Theorem 4. Fix a fair cost sharing game with unit minimum weight (푤min = 1), and let 푤max,푊 be the
maximum weight and the maximum total load. Then, for any 휆 ≥ 1, our game has an (훼, 훽)-equilibrium
where 훼 = max((1 + 1푤max) ln(1 + 푤max), ln(푤max) + 휆) , 훽 = 1 + ln푊휆 .
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훼
11.386
2.443
훼
훽
1 훩(ln푤max)
훩(ln푊 )
훩(ln푊 )훩(1)
Figure 1: Fair cost sharing games. Left: guarantee on the existence of 훼-approximate equilibria, as a function of 푤max, given
by Theorem 4 (setting 휆 = 1). Right: trade-off curve for the existence of (훼, 훽)-equilibria, given by Theorem 4; here we choose
푤max = 3,푊 = 50. For comparison, the previously best bounds [CR09, Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 5.3] are plotted in red, while
our results are in blue.
Proof. Combining Theorem 1 with Lemma 5 we conclude that, for 휆 ≥ 1, our game has an (훼, 훽)-
equilibrium with
훼 = 훼2훼1 = max((1 + 1푤max) ln(1 + 푤max), ln(푤max) + 휆) , 훽 = 훽2/훼1훽1/훼1 = ln푊 + 휆휆 = 1 + ln푊휆 .
The parameter 휆 quantifies the trade-off curve between the approximation guarantee on equilibria
and their price of stability. At one extreme case 휆 = 1, we get that
훼 = max((1 + 1푤max) ln(1 + 푤max), ln(푤max) + 1) = 훩(ln푤max), 훽 = 1 + ln푊 ;
in other words, there exist 훩(ln푤max)-approximate equilibria with price of stability 훩(ln푊 ). At the
other extreme case 휆 = 훩(ln푊 ), we get that
훼 = max((1 + 1푤max) ln(1 + 푤max), ln(푤max) + 훩(ln푊 )) = 훩(ln푊 ), 훽 = 1 + ln푊훩(ln푊 ) = 훩(1);
in other words, there exist 훩(ln푊 )-approximate equilibria with constant price of stability 훩(1). The
complete trade-off curve can be seen in Fig. 1 (right). We can also compare our results with the best
known upper bounds. In [CR09, Lemma 5.3], it was shown that 훼-approximate equilibria exist for훼 ≥ log2[푒(1 + 푤max)]; and in [CR09, Theorem 5.1], it was shown that (푓 , 1 + 2 log2(1+푊 )푓 )-equilibria
exist for any 푓 ≥ 2 log2[푒(1 + 푤max)]. As Fig. 1 shows, we improve on both results.
4.4 Mixtures of Cost Functions
A big advantage of our approach is that we can study the existence of (훼, 훽)-equilibria for games that
merge cost functions of two or more different types. For example, in this section we look at congestion
games that have both concave costs and polynomial costs (as well as any conical combination). Inter-
estingly, we show that tis results in only a small increase in the PoS guarantee of Theorem 2, while the
existence guarantee stays the same. For the following theorem we consider polynomials of degree at
least 2, since affine functions are themselves concave and would be already captured by Theorem 3.
Theorem 5. Any weighted congestion game with cost functions that are conical combinations of concave
and polynomial costs of maximum degree 푑 ≥ 2 has an (휆, 1 + 푑+1휆 )-equilibrium, for any 휆 ∈ [푑, 푑 + 1].
Proof. Fix a maximum degree 푑 ≥ 2 for the polynomial costs and a parameter 휆 ∈ [푑, 푑 + 1]. By
defining 휇 = 푑+12휆 we have that 12 ≤ 휇 ≤ 12 (1 + 1푑 ) ≤ 1, and so by applying Lemma 4 we can derive that
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any concave cost is (휇, 휇 + 12 , 12 , 휇 + 12 )-good. Next, by Lemmas 2 and 3 we can derive that all monomials
of degree 푘 = 0,… , 푑 − 1 are ( 1푘+1 , 1, 1푘+1 , 1푘+1 )-good and the monomial of degree 푑 is ( 1휆 , 1, 1푑+1 , 1휆 )-good.
Deploying our black-box tool Theorem 1 (and shortcutting some calculations that we have already
performed in the proof of Theorem 2) we can guarantee the existence of an (훼, 훽)-equilibrium with훼 = max{1 + 12휇 , 휆} = max{1 + 휆푑 + 1 , 휆} = 휆,
since 2 ≤ 푑 ≤ 휆 ≤ 푑 + 1, and
훽 = max{ 휇+1/2휇 , 1}min{ 1/2휇 , 휆푑+1} = 1 + 12휇min{ 12휇 , 휆푑+1} = 1 + 2휇 = 1 + 푑 + 1휆 ,
where for the third equality we used that, from the definition of 휇, 12휇 = 휆푑+1 .
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A Technical Lemmas
Lemma 6. For 푤, 푥 ∈ [1,∞), the function푅(푤, 푥) = (1 + 푥푤) ln (1 + 푤푥 )
is increasing in 푤 and decreasing in 푥 .
Proof. Let us apply the change of variables 1푧 ≡ 1 + 푥푤 , so that we can write푅(푤, 푥) = (1 + 푥푤) ln (1 + 푤푥 ) ≡ ln ( 11−푧 )푧 .
Since 푤, 푥 ∈ [1,∞), it follows that 1/푧 ∈ (1,∞) and thus 푧 ∈ (0, 1). Notice now that ln ( 11−푧 ) is convex
for 푧 ∈ (0, 1), since its first derivative,푑푑푧 ln( 11 − 푧) = − 푑푑푧 ln (1 − 푧) = 11 − 푧
is increasing in 푧. Since in addition ln ( 11−푧 )|||푧=0 = 0, we conclude that ln ( 11−푧 ) /푧 is increasing in 푧.
Since 푧 = 푤푤+푥 is increasing in 푤 and decreasing in 푥 , the result follows.
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